1.
Skeaff wonders about the exclusive emphasis I place upon intercorporeal communication as the forum for challenging dominant ideology, given the significant and growing role that media plays in our lives. He asks: "What role, if any, do media (televisual, web-based, textual, etc.) play in the mobilization of counter-ideas and how might that role affect the co-presence requirement? Are media simply a tool for disseminating ideas that are first composed in an assembly setting or can media take on a more constitutive role in the generation of ideas?"
He asks further whether my focus on spoken language rather than the written word is justified. In his words, "The comprehension of spoken language might best be accomplished through an immersion experience with native speakers. However, one can learn a written language by relating one's body to non-human bodies such as texts."
On the one hand, it might seem delusional to deny or even to underplay the efficacy of media communications. The average person in North America spends many more hours a week encountering ideas from the web, television, and, albeit to a much lesser extent, written texts than in conversation with other people. Spinoza himself was deeply interested in the social and political effects of a particular set of holy writings. I do not mean to deny the kind of term-setting that media has the power to carry out, or the way that virtual or scholarly communities form pockets of resistance to the dominant ideology. Yet, I suspect that there is a kind of ontological and developmental primacy to intercorporeal communication, which is supported by Spinoza's emphasis on the body's increasing diversification as the basis for our cognitive powers. Let me say more about what I mean.
Although I certainly am not an expert in language acquisition or psychosocial development, a couple of studies support my intuition. It has been found that infants cannot learn language through video (Kuhl). Although infants are typically incredibly adaptable and can learn any language through simple exposure to other speakers, the co-presence of actual human bodies is necessary for them to learn to dispose their bodies in the new ways required to learn a language. A study shows that infants can learn to make sounds in a language other than the one spoken by their parents very easily with face-to-face interaction. But if this supplementary language-learning is replaced by a video, the infant not only fails to learn to make the sounds, her acquired powers to understand and communicate are diminished.
Among adults, it has been shown that those condemned to solitary confinement very quickly, in the words of Lisa Guenther, become "unhinged" in the absence of intercorporeal contact (Guenther, forthcoming). Even when allowed television, books, and skype or telephone conversation with loved ones, they quickly lose any sense of time and suffer other radical perceptual distortions. Women are not responsible for their own rapes, and nor should they bear the burden of rape prevention strategies. Women and girls are frequently taught constantly to anticipate attack, and to consider themselves "rapable," lest they take appropriate self-protective measures. The impulse to direct rape prevention strategies at rapists rather than at rape victims is understandable and even laudable.
Nevertheless, I commented on the post, indicating that I far prefer the sign that says, Rape is caused by misogyny (check), rapists (check), institutional tolerance (check), and structural violence (check). I suggested adding something, for lack of a better term, like "rape culture." Someone objected strongly to my preference saying that, although what I prefer might be truer, it is not more effective, and is a poor strategy because it is both grand and vague. Such a critique is close to my heart, since, as Skeaff mentions, I don't think we are best served by thumping against shared commonsense with the rather flaccid hammer of truth, without considering the power of the particular idea within its affective context. Isn't it the case that more people will be moved by the straightforward and easily digested assertion that rapists cause rape? Isn't it easier to identify and hold responsible rapists than an entire culture and its institutions for constituting women as rapable until proven otherwise? PhaenEx Still, while my opponent said that my preferred sign wouldn't do anything, I objected to the impulse to be effective regardless of the particular effects. If rapists are the cause of rape, what should be done? The individual assailants should be identified and in some way neutralized. Feminist vigilantes for a long time have publicized the names of the accused, humiliated rapists, and sometimes attacked them. I, in fact, have some sympathy for this approach given the near futility of prosecuting rapists. Nevertheless, mobilizing people to stop individual actors identified as rapists is committing to a never-ending game of whack-a-mole.
Wide education programs that target boys is something I would support, though I would worry about the form it would take. For example, I hope it would not suggest that they "just say no" to misogyny and rape, as though it were simply a matter of will-power, and as though they need to control their intrinsic ability to hurt girls, thereby reinforcing the notion that boys are powerful and dangerous and girls are vulnerable and in need of protection. Likewise, I hope it would somehow convey to them the joys they would be forfeiting, whether or not they are orthosexual, by failing to see girls and women as partners and agents. Of course, structural, critical analysis is a cornerstone of feminism and Marxism, the traditions closest to my heart. It is nonetheless easy, as Dean notes, to revert to dualist, individualist, and voluntarist models, especially in more activist contexts. Structural analyses, even my own, often still imply something like a collective will, and thus rely on an implicit humanism. I admit that it is very difficult-and perhaps not always strategically advisable-to fully renaturalize our political speech.
I will close discussion of this point by marking my appreciation of Dean's observation that Spinoza's is significantly a therapeutic philosophy, and that my joining Spinoza to feminism has a therapeutic impulse. It is aimed at reducing self-castigation and guilt to which I think a lot of feminists, myself included, are inclined. I do hope that critique and activism driven fundamentally by an analysis of institutional and affective networks can allow us to forgive ourselves and even our enemies for failures and weaknesses, and to seek solutions in countering causes that sustain and amplify destructive forms of life.
3. This leads to the third question, posed both by Karen Houle and Rebecca Tuvel:
Where does the "heavy normative lifting" come from that would allow us to call some things pernicious and affirm other things as worthy of cultivation?
Houle is concerned that the ecological framework I espouse lacks the resources for differentiating between those incipient, fragile ideas that deserve cultivation and those that should not. Likewise, Tuvel wonders about the normative ability of an ethological perspective "to discern between powerful or enabling affective connections to, not only animals, but likewise computers, landfills, or trash?"
Certainly, it can be very complicated to identify the actual source of sad passions and the precise causes of decreases in the vitality of an individual or groups. For one, the causes are usually many, and are easily misidentified. There are many wide-ranging theories, for example, as what causes certain cancers: candidates include environmental pollutants (and, if so, which ones, under which circumstances?), heredity, lifestyle, behavior, stress, pharmaceuticals, etc.
Yet, I still don't see that anything like "heavy normative lifting" is necessary in order to determine that cancer is a damaging mode of bodily transformation. Although it is true that, from the point of view of absolute nature, it makes no difference whether a new ice age obliterates most current forms of life and gives rise to a whole new infinitely complex network of relations, the finite perspective of practical reason has little difficulty determining that cancer or a new ice age is bad for human, canine, or rodent bodies. Moreover, as a particular kind of being, each of us by necessity desires to persevere in being, and thus each perceives threats to that perseverance PhaenEx as pernicious. One would have to show that landfills, for example, are a genuine threat to that perseverance, but, having done so, one doesn't need an eternal standard or supernatural framework to advocate mobilizing against those finite assemblages we call landfills.
Moreover, Spinoza acknowledges not only a physiological but also a mental or psychic striving to be the kinds of beings we are. This is why he says that a populace will not tolerate the trampling of their freedoms, since we aspire, by necessity, to a life characterized by a kind of spiritual vitality, or, in his words, "a life of reason" (Spinoza, Chapter 5, paragraph 5). Thus, we strive for those ideas through which we feel ourselves to be powerful, and we resist those ideal assemblages that we identify-correctly or incorrectly-as sources of sadness and pain. The ethos of renaturalization is supported by prudential rather than moral rationality, but prudence is armed with plenty of evaluations. And those evaluations do not concern only the narrow domain of physical survival, but also the desire to exist and to enhance one's characteristic powers and pleasures, very much including those of the mind.
One of my aims, however, is to challenge some of Spinoza's own prudential evaluations.
Such evaluations can always be mistaken, and my view is that he was profoundly mistaken about the powers and pleasures that emerge from companionship with nonhuman animals. Likewise, Spinoza was confused and conflicted about whether women and men could effectively combine to enhance one another's agency. All of these evaluations are open to challenge, and may be falsified by the consequences that follow from our actions. Indeed, they are the fruits of models for living well that issue from imagination as well as reason, and thus they have no truck with absolute figures of good and evil. Yet, as Deleuze points out, they are not, and nor could they hope to be, beyond good and bad (Deleuze, (22) (23) (24) (25) .
4.
This leads to Tuvel's question about how to support ethical alliances with nonhuman animals, especially those that cannot immediately be identified as essential to human wellbeing. This relates, as well, to Fritsch's skepticism toward an "ethics of similitude."
First, I'll acknowledge that my embrace of the notion of "an ethics of similitude" has given rise to the greatest confusion and concern, especially among Continental philosophers and feminists, which suggests that I did not describe it well enough. I hope to begin to redress this weakness by underscoring two basic principles. ii.
An ethics of similitude does not preclude a profound importance placed upon
diversity and, more specifically, diversification: First, a principle: Spinoza says that the more a body can be disposed in a great variety of ways, the more perceptive is its mind (Ethics II, prop.
14). I take this to mean that, the more an individual undergoes a diverse range of experiences and a great many encounters with different kinds of bodies, the more powerful and perceptive is its mind. Thus, I am more thoughtful and powerful the more diverse the others beings are with whom I come into contact. Yet, for Spinoza, I change in response to these contacts and take on some shared ideas and affects as a result. Thus, whereas an ethics of difference emphasizes letting others be in their difference, and, in particular, resisting assimilating diverse others to the self, Spinoza's ethics of similitude describes and promotes the mutual transformations that diverse others provoke in one another so as to produce commonalities.
Thus, the second principle: the more a body has in common with other bodies, the more its mind is able to perceive them adequately (Ethics II, prop. 39, corollary). So, perhaps it would be better to say that Spinoza advocates an ethics of becoming similar through mutual transformation and affection. But this becoming similar to others only occurs by virtue of becoming increasingly different from oneself by diversifying one's body, affects, and experiences to the greatest extent that one's nature allows. This ethics certainly is not without serious risks, but my hunch is that it has greater potential than an ethics of difference to support a politics of collective mobilization and radical transformation.
Notions of similarity suggest creating a community of "us" and thus also of "them," and legitimately raises worries about oppression and exclusion. I doubt that any philosophical program escapes worries that its principles for ethical connection or moral regard can justify unsavory exclusions. Yet, I want to suggest that an adequate reading of Spinoza's ethics of similitude will not provide a moral justification for excluding and oppressing different others by virtue of sex, race, ability, etc.
On Spinoza's own account, the natures of men and women can agree so perfectly that they might combine to form an individual twice as powerful as each one (Ethics IV, prop. 68, scholium). Bodies that appear quite different morphologically, or phenotypically, are not thereby prevented from being the greatest sources of joy and power, among all other beings in nature.
Thus, sexual difference is not a dissimilarity that would necessarily pose a problem to combining powers, or forming ethical bonds, although Spinoza does worry about the circumstances in which women and men meet, and how they may undermine the possibility for mutual empowerment (see Political Treatise, chapter 11, section 4). Ultimately, the very broad grounds for similarity suggest, pace Spinoza, that we need to look further and wider for alliances with others, beyond the parochial limits of the human, or the rational. We would likewise benefit from re-examining our ideas of meekness and strength and discovering diverse singular expressions of perfection. We might then discover less obvious ways of being powerful, and enjoy them not only as differences to be wondered at, as on Irigaray's model, but as differences that might rub off on us and enrich our lives.
5.
Finally, Matthias Fritsch raises a number of knotty and difficult questions about the character of affirmation and negation, and presses me for unnecessarily assuming a Hegelian, developmental model of negativity. He doubts whether it is possible to promote an ethics of selfaffirmation that is not also an ethics of self-negation, of affirming or self-overcoming and thus our externality, even in the form of death.
In essence, Fritsch is challenging Spinoza's logic of ethical alliance and ethical transformation, and thus urging me to be less faithful to Spinoza's express claims and, in his view, truer to my own interpretation of his ontology, especially as it is laid out in the first chapter of the book in the section on "transindividuality." Ultimately, his question could be expressed thus: Doesn't reading modal life in terms of Simondon's transindividuality commit me to affirming negation, otherness, and even the non-alien character of death as part of a selfaffirming, self-aware ethical life? Aren't Spinoza's avowals that a "free man thinks of nothing less than death" (Ethics IV, prop. 67) , and that what destroys me is always "external" to my essence or nature (Ethics III, prop. 6), in great tension or even contradiction with his claims that we only exist by virtue of the concurrent activity of others (Ethics, ubique) , and that we must undergo constant mutation in order to remain ourselves (Ethics II, prop. 13, postulate IV)?
Ultimately, these questions pertain to a distinction that neither Spinoza nor I always make fear of pain, suffering, and death, and this is why we often make such foolish decisions, and establish such repressive societies. Building an ethics around the logic of existence rather than that of essence, he maintains, results in servility. This is an ethics that cannot pursue the good directly, but only as an afterthought. Now, Fritsch is not advocating a servile ethics, which would be one built on the fear of death, but rather an ethics that affirms the necessity of death by virtue of our ineluctable implication in the beings of others. Yet, when he doubts the virtues of pursuing "the good" at the conclusion of his comments, the specter of scarcity and violent death emerge. Spinoza's wager, and I suspect he is right, is that when you start with the thought of death, with what threatens to exclude, harm, and mutilate us, you get an ethics of practical reason-a calculus of costs and benefits-that never reaches the therapeutic goals of Spinoza's ethics of radical affirmation. This PhaenEx is not to say that a complete ethics (in which is included politics, for Spinoza) can leave aside the concerns with dangers, threats, and the many poisonous features of our life-worlds, but it cannot have these as their foundation. The order of reasoning requires that we first learn to regard ourselves as eternal expressions of nature's infinite power and then determine the practical limits of that power, and how best to live within them. Given the immense difficulty of thinking about ourselves as part of nature, and of considering our singular powers as perfect in their own right, I
suspect that Spinoza is right. Yet, this is not to insist that Fritsch is wrong about the need to accept and ultimately affirm our own deaths, but to surmise that such acceptance of the volatility of this life can only come after feeling the thrill of life as such.
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